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Provigil: A Commentary
By DANIEL A. CRANE*
No issue has attracted more antitrust scholarship over the past
decade than the skirmishing between branded and generic drug
manufacturers. The battles have raged over a variety of legal terrain,
including patent law, FDA regulation, the Hatch-Waxman Act,' and
antitrust law. Just as troubling-or perhaps more troubling-than the
generic/branded battles have been their truces, legal settlements that
have allegedly resulted in unlawful market division and impeded
entry by other generics.
The stakes are obviously enormous. Static efficiency losses,
occasioned by monopolistic overcharges by branded and generic
firms, perhaps run into the billions. Equally or more important are
the dynamic efficiency implications. In recent years we have seen a
dramatic and troubling slowing in the pace and importance of pioneer
drug applications. Recently, the Obama Administration announced
that it had become so concerned about the lethargic pace of new
drugs that the administration is starting a new billion-dollar drug
development center.2 Whether the drug wars between pioneer firms
and generics have anything to do with this innovation lethargy, and, if
so, what effect the drug wars have on the pace of innovation, are
weighty matters of public concern.
Michael Carrier's case study on Provigil' offers new support for
the view that Big Pharma is to blame for stymieing competition,
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan; Counsel, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison LLP.
1. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
2. Gardiner Harris, Citing Slow Pace of New Drugs, US to Open $1b Development
Center, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 23, 2011, available at http://www.boston.com
/lifestyle/health/articles/2011/01/23/citing-slow.pace of-new.drugs usto-open1 b-devel
opmentcenter/.
3. Michael Carrier, Povigil: A Case Study of Anticompetitive Behavior,3 HAST. SCI.
& TECH. L. J. 441 (2011).
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retarding innovation, and inflating prices in the drug industry.
Carrier argues that Cephalon was able to thwart generic entry by a
combination of anticompetitive strategies. It entered into a reverse
payment settlement agreement with generics seeking to enter the
market. These settlements purported to allow generic entry before
the expiration of the patent period, but, according to Carrier, the
promise of early entry was negated by the second prong of
Cephalon's anticompetitive strategy. During the time that it had
bought by the patent settlement, Cephalon rolled out a new sleep
disorder drug-Nuvigil-supposedly to frustrate generic entry.
Since the purpose of Carrier's case study is presumably not
merely to support legal action against Cephalon but to motivate
continued scrutiny of Big Pharma's patent practices and perhaps a
change in the governing legal or regulatory norms, it is worth taking a
minute to assess his claims and ponder the wisdom of generalizing
from them to broader public policy prescriptions. Having already
spilled considerable ink on the patent settlements issue,4 1 Will focus
my commentary on Carrier's "product hopping" claims-essentially,
that Cephalon rolled out Nuvigil merely to thwart competition. Since
I have no expertise with the relevant products and no particular dog
in the fight between Cephalon and its antagonists, I limit myself to
three very general observations about the case study and its
ostensible morals for public policy.
First, it is noteworthy that, upon introducing Nuvigil, Cephalon
did not withdraw Provigil from the market. Cephalon still offers
Provigil today. In 2012, Provigil will become available in generic
form. Carrier dismisses the significance of Cephalon's decision to
keep Provigil, noting that Cephalon raised the price of Provigil to
induce customers to switch to Nuvigil when the latter became
available. Carrier seems to assume that once customers switch to
Nuvigil, they will not switch back to a lower-priced generic Provigil.
But that is an empirical question that has not yet been tested,
since generic Provigil is not yet available. One blogger has noted that
"[i]f generic Provigil was to hit the market, patients who converted to
Nuvigil would likely be pressured by payers to switch back to a
4. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Regulation of Patent Settlements, in ISSUES IN
COMPETITION POLICY (Dale Collins ed., 2009); Daniel. A. Crane, Ease Over Accuracy in
Assessing Patent Settlements: A Reply to Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 88 MINN. L. REV.
698 (2004); Daniel A. Crane, Per Se Illegality for Reverse Payment Settlements?, 61 ALA.

L. REV. 575 (2010) (book review symposium, invited contribution); Daniel A. Crane, Exit
Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic
Implications,54 FLA. L. REV. 747 (2002).

SUMMER 2011]1

PROVIGIL

455

5

cheaper Provigil generic." Time will tell what effect the advent of
generic Provigil will have on Provigil and Nuvigil prices and sales.
For now, observe that the driving assumption in Carrier's case
study-that a switch to Nuvigil is a one-way street-remains to be
tested.
It's no answer to say that Cephalon's pricing strategy evidences
Cephalon's hope to switch customers to Nuvigil. Of course Cephalon
hopes to persuade customers that they are better off with a higher
price product that will remain in patent for years to come. The
question is whether customers will find Nuvigil sufficiently better
than generic Provigil-a question that we can't yet answer.
Second, and relatedly, part of the reason that we don't know
what will happen when generic Provigil hits the market is that it's
hard to tell how great the advantages of Nuvigil over Provigil actually
are. Carrier dismisses the benefits as small, but there seems to be a
case that the benefits are substantial, at least for some patients.
Nuvigil is longer acting, has more rapid onset, and has fewer side
effects.' It may be more effective for some patients in treating sleep
disorders, and have benefits for conditions beyond sleep disorders
including ADHD, depression, bipolar depression, anxiety, and
schizophrenia.'
Are these possible benefits sufficient to justify the purchase of
Nuvigil once a generic and substantially less expensive version of
Provigil becomes available? That will surely be a patient-specific
issue,' and only the availability of generic Provigil will answer the
question. As far as I can tell, the case has yet to be made that
customers will continue to pay for higher priced Nuvigil because of
lock in or that Nuvigil isn't worth its future price premium over
generic Provigil.
This brings me to my third concern with Carrier's case studythe implicit suggestion that courts should get into the business of
scrutinizing "product hopping." Alarmingly, there is precedent for
such judicial second guessing of pharmaceutical product changes. In
5. Evelyn Pringle, The Rise and Fall of Provigil- Part II, SALIENT NEWS (Sept. 21,
2010, 5:00 AM), available at http://www.salient-news.com/2010/09/provogil-cephalon/.
6. See David Rosenberg, Nuvigil May Have Major Advantages Compared to
Provigil,GERSON LEHRMAN GROUP (June 21, 2007), available at http://www.glgroup
.com/News/Nuvigil-may-have-major-advantages-compared-to-Provigil-12978.html.
7. Id.
8. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: How EXCESSIVE
GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 118-19 (2006)

(discussing patient heterogeneity and consequences for regulation of drug availability).
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Abbott Laboratories v. Teva Pharmaceuticals,' the federal district
court in Delaware confronted a claim that the branded manufacturer
of Tricor, an anti-cholesterol drug, blocked generic entry by switching
the product's formulation from capsule to tablet form.'o This
formulation switch allegedly prevented pharmacies from making
generic substitution of Tricor prescriptions." The district court ruled
that the plaintiff-competitors had stated a monopolization claim.
Indeed, the court held that plaintiffs could pursue a product hopping
claim even if it turned out that the new formulation was superior to
the old formulation and that there were procompetitive reasons for
the introduction of the new formulation:
[A]n antitrust inquiry into the benefits provided by Defendants'
product changes is appropriate. Contrary to Defendants'
assertion, Plaintiffs are not required to prove that the new
formulations were absolutely no better than the prior version or
that the only purpose of the innovation was to eliminate the
complementary product of a rival. Rather, as in Microsoft, if
Plaintiffs show anticompetitive harm from the formulation
changes, that harm will be weighed against any benefits
presented by Defendants.12
The implications of this ruling are disturbing. Suppose that you
are the general counsel of a branded pharmaceutical company whose
product managers want to know whether they can change the
formulation of one of their drugs. Suppose that there are likely
patient benefits from the change, but also some risk that generic
competitors will see the change as a form of "product hopping" that
could stymie their entry into the market. Your job as general counsel
is to assess the probability that a jury of twelve retired postal workers
(metaphorically) would conclude years after the fact that the
potentially life-saving benefits to some patients were outweighed by
the harms to competition from "product hopping." In the event the
jury reached the conclusion that harms outweighed benefits, they
would enter a lost profits damages award to competitors and an
overcharge damages award to a class action of consumers that would
each be automatically trebled (and attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs
9.
10.
11.
12.

432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006).
Id. at 416.
Id.
Id. at 422.
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automatically granted). Assuming an even mildly risk-averse class of
general counsels, one has to worry about the innovation effects of a
product hopping liability rule.
If there is a silver lining to the Abbott opinion it is the court's
apparent recognition that if Abbott had kept the old formulation on
the market when it introduced the new formulation, any
anticompetitive effect on consumers would have arisen from
consumer choice and therefore would not have been actionable." If
such a rule were adopted, then Cephalon would be off the hook for
product hopping, since it left Provigil on the market when it
introduced Nuvigil. Alas, Carrier's case study seems designed to
draw even that constraint on product hopping liability into question.
Time will tell whether consumers prefer cheap generic Provigil to
expensive patented Nuvigil. Hopefully, the courts will not take it
upon themselves to make that decision in the place of consumers.

13. Id. at 421-22.
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